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Jack Effron* and Using Statistical Techniques to
John Forster** Predict Non-Pecuniary Damage
Awards in Personal Injury Cases
L Introduction
The real issue in personal injury cases is often damages1. Our concepts
and law relating to negligence and other aspects of personal injury are
sufficiently developed that parties can often agree upon who is at fault.
Yet damages law, for all the cases and principles which have been
decided, remains the least intelligible and thus the least predictable for
parties and their counsel. When parties have to go to trial in a personal
injury case, it is often primarily to decide who should pay what.
In the mystery land of damages law, the biggest mystery, even for
lawyers, is non-pecuniary damages. Compared to non-pecuniary damage
awards, pecuniary loss is just a matter of presenting bills for payment and
plugging numbers into formulae. While pecuniary loss must often be
speculative or technical, requiring expert evidence on inflation rates,
present value and projected loss of income, it does not present as much
of an appearance of being random, arbitrary or unexplainable.
Non-pecuniary loss appears mysterious, random, arbitrary and
unexplainable even to those who deal with it because, more than any
other aspect of personal injury, it must be compensated based upon the
actual circumstances of the person who has been hurt. There are no
shortcuts to assessing non-pecuniary loss, no expert predictions or
formulae to assist the court in its responsibility to assess the injured
person's condition. As the condition to be assessed differs so markedly
from case to case, in the absence of general principles, the whole area
seems to be a murky mire2.
*B.A. (Econ.) LL.B. Ph.D., of Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.
**B.A. M.Sc. Ph.D., of Griflith University, Brisbane Australia. The authors would like to express
their gratitude to the following who were helpful in this project: the University of British Columbia
Computer Centre, especially Glen Cooper;, the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law for
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I. The authors are indebted to Professor Stephen Wexler of the University of British Columbia for
drawing their attention to this fact.
2. Thus, most writers on this subject begin by noting that money cannot replace lost functions or take
away pain. See eg., Kahn-Freund, 0., "The Expectation of Happiness" (1941), 5 Mod. L.R 81;
Klar, L, "The Assessment of Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses" (1978), 5 C.C.L.T. 262;
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Existing jurisprudence has offered little assistance to lawyers, judges
and parties trying to work through cases of non-pecuniary loss. The basic
principle remains that the assessment of non-pecuniary damages is a
matter within the discretion of the trial court3. Despite a trilogy4,
becoming a quadrilogy5 of decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in
this area, the only rule which the Supreme Court has enforced
consistently is that the award should not exceed $100,0006, probably in
1978 dollars7.
While the Supreme Court of Canada has argued at length the blessings
of the "functional approach" to non-pecuniary loss8, no court in Canada
(including the Supreme Court itself) has ever considered what
"alternative pleasures" a plaintiff would use a damage award for, nor has
there ever been a clear explanation of how this would be done. Canadian
courts have properly copied what the Supreme Court of Canada did
(ignoring what it said) and merely used the functional approach as an
excuse to keep non-pecuniary damage awards low9, arguably for political
rather than legal reasons10.
Given the illusion of the functional approach, there is virtually no rule
for calculating non-pecuniary loss, beyond the Supreme Court of
McLachlin, B. "What Price Disability?" (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 1. However, this is a non-issue:
money does not replace lost reputation in defamation or lost goodwill in passing-off goods, but we
do not seem to have such problems in using money to compensate these injuries. It is submitted that
what the writers are referring to is the lack of any agreed method for relating pain and lost faculties
to amounts of money. As Dickson, J. put it in Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alt& Ltd., [1978] 1 W.W.R.
577 at 602 (S.C.C.) the problem is that there is no "medium of exchange" for happiness, no
"market" for pain and disability, not that money cannot do miracles.
3. Nance v. B.C. Electric Railway Co., [1951 ] A.C. 601, Andrews, supra, note 2, at 235 and LeBlanc
v.Penticton, [1981] 5 W.W.R. 289 (B.C.C.A.).
4. Andrews, supra note 2; see also Thronton v. Board of School Trustees of School District No. 57
(Prince George), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267 andArnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287 (S.C.C.).
5. With the addition ofLindal v. Lindal, [1982] 1 W.W.R. 433 (S.C.C.), revisiting the non-pecuniary
damages issue specifically.
6. See Klar, L., "Developments in Tort Law" (1983), 5 Sup. Ct. Rev. 273.
7. There is some doubt about the whether the limit on non-pecuniary damages is in 1974 or 1978
dollars. See'Hatton v. Henderson (1981), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 50 (B.C.C.A.).
8. See" Andrews and Linda supra, note 4._
9. Penso v. Solowan andPublic Trustee, [1982] 4 W.W.R. 385 at 395-396 (B.C.CA.).
10. One of the authors has argued elsewhere that the interest in limiting non-pecuniary loss
compensation arises primarily from the political power of third-party insurers (including the State)
vis-a-vis that of the small group of injured plaintiffs and that such limitation is inconsistent with any
legal principle of awarding damages. Effron, J., "A Comparative Study of Nonpecuniary Damages
in Common Law Countries" (1988), 10 Houston J. Int. Law 211 at 229. Dickson, . virtually
admitted this in Linda supra, note 4, at 12, by stating that, while "social costs" must never be
considered in awarding future pecuniary loss, they must be considered in awarding non-pecuniary
loss compensation. "Social costs" in this context means little more than the costs of third-party
insurers who pay the compensation.
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Canada's vague demands that the awards be kept as low as possible. In
this vacuum, courts do not know how to calculate non-pecuniary damage
awards. In the smokescreen of the functional approach, parties, counsel,
scholars and the public at large do not know how courts are calculating
non-pecuniary damages.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how Canadian judges award
non-pecuniary loss compensation and, from such a picture of present
reality, to bring more clarity and pragmatism to discussion and practice
in this area. A clear picture of how non-pecuniary damages are being
calculated can be useful to parties and lawyers in predicting,
understanding, and accepting how damages will be awarded in their own
cases. A clearer picture of how non-pecuniary loss is being compensated
can be helpful to appellate judges and policymakers in making decisions
about how non-pecuniary damage awards ought to be calculated.
II. The Technique of Analysis
A lawyer would consider that the most obvious place in which to look
to see how non-pecuniary damages are being calculated is at the reasons
of the judges who compensate non-pecuniary damages. The basis of this
study is therefore over 100 Canadian non-pecuniary damage awards at
trial and appellate level in 1978-8211.
There is a problem, however, in just reading the judges' reasons and
stopping there. The normal practice is for the judge to list the plaintiffs'
injuries and then award a figure for compensation, without explaining the
connexion between the injuries and the award12. We know intuitively
and as a matter of law (since the judge's decision must be based upon the
evidence and the purpose of the award is still restitutio in integrum) that
there is a logical connection between the plaintiff's injuries and the
award, but we do not know the nature of the connection. In fact, the
Supreme Court of Canada's insistence upon a global award13 and its
11. The cases used are available from the authors on request.
12. A typical example is the following extract from Paterson v. Bearchief(1978), 14 A.R. 48 at 65-
66 (Alta S.C.): "The evidence establishes that there was substantial pain and suffering for
considerable time. The plaintiff suffered several operations and also had several physiotherapy
treatments. His major loss was the sight of an eye. There is a possibility... of the loss of his other
eye. The disability in his left arm restricts many of his activities. He has suffered disfigurement to his
face, throat, arm and leg... The plaintiff was a normal, healthy young man before the accident He
is now considerably restricted in many of his activities. I think a fair assessment on this score would
be $35,000.00".
13. Dickson, . endorsed this "customary" practice in Andrews, supra, note 4, at 264.
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disdain for giving "so much for a foot"14 discourages judges from
explaining how the plaintiff's injuries determine the extent of the award.
Therefore, if we are to tell from the practice of judges facing various
sorts of injuries how they assess damages and to see whether there is any
common rule or practice among judges in assessing damages, we can only
do so by observation of the results and logical inference therefrom.
Happily, the multiple regression technique in statistics is designed for
such circumstances: to test the likelihood that our assumption that the
type and severity of injuries determines the level of the award is true and
to help us predict, given a set of injuries, what level of compensation these
judges would award.
The use of statistics in law has won rapid and increasing acceptance in
recent years. The best-accepted and most-established use of statistics in
law has been the use of statistical evidence to show "patterns" and
"practices" of racial and sexual discrimination by employers in the
United States15.Such statistics have been accepted by American courts as
evidence in Civil Rights Act cases. Another common use of statistical and
mathematical techniques has been in the criminal justice system, to
determine optimal jury size, pre-trial detention policy, etc., also mostly in
the United States16. Quantitative techniques have been used as well in
calculating pecuniary damages in discrimination and tort cases, to deal
with such issues as present value of awards and lost wages or back pay17.
Yet the use of quantitative methods in calculating pecuniary loss has
not been followed in calculating non-pecuniary loss, although, as argued
in this paper, it may be even more necessary to do so. Instead, lawyers
have been forced to look for substitutes. Personal injury practitioners are
familiar with consolidations of personal injury awards such as Cooper-
Stephenson and Saunders 8, which lay out the injuries and awards side-
by-side: what is missing is any statistical analysis which would explain the
14. See Dickson, J.'s comment on Ogus, A.'s "conceptual approach" to assessing non-pecuniary loss
"Damages for Lost Amenities" (1972), 35 Mod. L.R. 1, in Andrews, supra, note 4 at 261 and in
Lindal supra, note 5 at 451.
15. Copus, D., "The Numbers Game Is the Only Game in Town" (1977), 20 Harv. LJ. 374;
Whittan, D., "Statistics and Title VII Proof' (1978), 15 Houston L.R. 1030; Bode, E., "Auditing
Affirmative Action through Multiple Regression Analysis" (1980), 31 Labor LJ. 115.
16. Clarke, S. and Koch, G., "The Influence of Income and Other Factors on Whether Criminal
Defendants Go to Prison" (1976), 11 Law and Soc. Rev. 57; Kaye D., "The Laws of Probability and
the Law of the Land" (1979), 47 Univ. of Chi, L.R. 34; Nagel, S., "Some Statistical Considerations
in Legal Policy Analysis" (1980), 13 Conn. L.R. 17.
17. Greenberg. R., "Quantitative Aspects of Legal Analysis", [1976] Insurance LJ. 589; Brains, M.
and Rines, N., "The Determination of Economic Loss in Tort Cases" (1976), 6 J. Contemp. L. 121;
Manning, J., "Multiple Regression Analysis", [1982J Univ. of Il. L.R. 449.
18. Cooper-Stephenson, K. and Saunders, I., Personal injury damages.'n Canada (Toronto: Carswell,
1988).
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connection between the awards and injuries rather than forcing the
lawyer to do his own ad hoc and guesswork prediction from looking at,
say, 15 awards for back injuries. Nagel has suggested the use of statistical
techniques, including the multiple regression technique used in this paper,
to predict personal injury case outcomes 19 and has conducted an
analogous study of civil liberties cases in the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1950s20.
Multiple regression is commonly used in social sciences such as
economics, political science and sociology2' when one has information
about a number of different variables which one believes are related: the'
purpose of the regression is to test the accuracy of this belief on the
information available. In our case, the "variables" which we believe are
related are the level of damage award and the various types of injury -
paralysis, incontinence, disfigurement, etc. Moreover, we believe that the
variables are related in certain ways: eg. that a greater degree of paralysis
would produce a higher level of damage award but a lesser degree of
paralysis would produce a lower award. The regression technique uses
mathematical principles to tell us whether, from the cases we have used,
a given injury is relevant to the level of damages awarded. In other
words, the regression techniques allows us to test whether Ison's
hypothesis that tort awards are merely a "lottery" 22 is true (in regard to
non-pecuniary damages in Canada for 1978-82) or whether there is in
fact a logical and explicable connection between award and injury, even
for the supposedly discretionary and inexplicable non-pecuniary award.
In addition, because the regression technique allows us to derive a
"regression equation", we can see, from the cases used, roughly what
each type of relevant injury was "worth" in damages.
We have deliberately omitted any discussion of the technical
mathematical operations which are involved in regression analysis and
concentrated upon the relevance of the technique to legal practice3. In
summary, multiple regression analysis allows us:
(i) to test alternative assumptions about how non-pecuniary damage
awards are arrived at;
(ii) to test assumptions about the impact of individual injuries and
plaintiff characteristics on the level of award to a plaintiff;
19. Nagel, S., "Predicting Court Cases Quantitatively" (1965), 63 Mich. L.R. 1411.
20. Nagel, S., supra, note 16.
21. See. Weisberg, S., Applied Linear Regression (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Beals,
R., Statistics For Economists (New York: R and McNally, 1972).
22. Ison, A., The Forensic Lottery (1967).
23. There is no shortage of books on statistics and regression in particular, eg., those cited at note 21.
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(iii) to make rational predictions about the level of award to a plaintiff
based upon information about that plaintiff's injuries and
characteristics; and
(iv) to have some idea of the degree of confidence we can have in the
conclusions reached in (i) - (iii).
L. The Study and Its Results
The study began by a reading of 101 Canadian negligence cases involving
the award of non-pecuniary damages. Although the judges, as explained
above, were less than clear about how they arrived at a figure for the non-
pecuniary damage award they gave, there was a pattern, in that the
judges seemed to refer to the same sorts of characteristics and injuries of
the plaintiffs in case after case. Also, certain injuries, such as paralysis and
incontinence, seemed to be mentioned in connection with the highest
awards. Therefore, a list was made of the sorts of injuries and plaintiff
characteristics which seemed to recur in the various judgments. Our
hypothesis was that these characteristics and injuries were the
determinants of the damage award: this was the hypothesis which we
used the regression technique to test. These "independent variables"
were: (1) whether or not the plaintiff was quadriplegic: (2) whether or
not the plaintiff was paralysed to a lesser degree than quadriplegia; (3)
whether or not the plaintiff was incontinent; (4) whether or not the
plaintiff was permanently unable to work at the job at which he had
worked before the injury; (5) whether or not the plaintiff was temporarily
unable to work at the job at which he had been working before the
injury; (6) whether or not the plaintiffs intelligence or ability to do such
simple tasks as carrying on conversation or doing simple arithmetic had
been damaged, (7) whether or not the plaintiff suffered psychological
damage such as depression or violence which had not been a part of his
personality before the injury; (8) whether or not (for males and females
separately) the plaintiff had suffered permanent physical disfigurement;
(9) whether or not the plaintiff had lost the ability to drive a car; (10)
whether or not the plaintiff had been rendered permanently unable to live
at home and must be institutionalised; (11) the length of time that the
plaintiff experienced pain; (12) the judges' comments about the intensity
of the pain experienced by the plaintiff; (13) whether or not the plaintiff
lost his sexual function; (14) whether or not the plaintiff had lost various
recreational activities such as sports or the ability to play with his
children, which he had enjoyed before the accident.
The second group of variables, which we hypothesised would affect
the non-pecuniary damage award, and which had been mentioned in
many of the cases, were factors about the plaintiffs loss rather than
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injuries per se: (15) how many days the plaintiff was in hospital; (16) the
likelihood of further medical treatment; (17) the prospects for
improvement or deterioration in the plaintiff's condition. Such factors
appeared to be considered by the judges as relevant to the seriousness of
the injury and lawyers will recognise them as the sorts of matters which
they try to lead in evidence if possible.
The final group of variables are what we call process variables,
referring not to the plaintiffs but to the impact of the legal process on the
award: (17) whether and to what extent the judge purported to follow the
Supreme Court of Canada's "trilogy" on personal injury awards; (18) the
year in which the judgment was rendered (which can also be a rough
surrogate for inflation); (19) the province in which the judgment was
rendered; (20) the age of the plaintiff; and (21) the gender of the plaintiff.
The specific techniques of defining these variables and entering them
into the regression equation in number form are described in Appendix
A. Here we are interested in the results of the regression, which are
themselves presented in statistical form in Appendix B.
Out of the 21 variables listed above, 10 come out of the study as
having a discernable impact on the level of the award24. These are listed
following, with the estimates of their values for the cases used in this
study:
(1) Quadriplegia - $70,920.72
(2) Paralysis less than quadriplegia - $30,299.80
(3) Incontinence - $22,546.96
(4) Inability to work - $16,136.88
(5) Reduced ability to work - $24,754.56
(6) Female with disfigurement- $14,898.87
(7) Inability to live at home - $24,173.79
(8) Length of pain (actual + projected) - $11.82 per week
(9) Age - total award reduced by $548.19 by each year of the
plaintiff's age
(10) Year - total award increased by $379.22 for each year after
1978.
Note, however, that the fact that a variable does not appear in the list
above does not necessarily mean that it had no effect on the level of the
awards, or would not do so today. If, for example, a given injury only
24. As explained in Appendix B, the regression was run twice, once with the requirement that zero
injuries yield zero award and once without such a requirement. As such a requirement is not only
legally and logically but also (as shown in Appendix B) statistically more sound, only the results of
the regression with this requirement are presented in the text. The results of both regressions are
presented in Appendix B, where it can be seen that they are quite similar.
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occurs a few times in the cases studied, this can be insufficient for the
regression to find a statistically-trustworthy result. The results are
influenced by statistical technique and are only relevant to the cases used.
IV Conclusions
It is not warranted that one can take the rough figures in this study and
predict a specific plaintiffs damage award in pending litigation. These are
"average" figures and a specific counsel's judge might not be the
"average" one for Canada's judiciary as a whole. Also, the cases used
were from the late 1970s and early 1980s: prices at least have changed
and the judiciary's approach to non-pecuniary damages may have
changed as well.
The significance of this study is more general. First, the study has
demonstrated that it is possible to get valid results from doing a multiple
regression analysis on the facts and decisions of cases. Others, by doing
similar regressions on other cases or more recent ones can show whether
or not these results really are of predictive value and what the rough
"value" of these injuries are in terms of damage awards. This study may
not alone be sufficient to use for prediction but it has shown the way. As
is shown in Appendix C, the statistical significance of the results of this
study is indeed impressive, so the technique may be said to have been
validated.
Indeed, there is no reason why this technique of using multiple
regression analysis to understand how legal decisions are made when the
reasons have not been made clear should be limited to non-pecuniary
damages. Some fruitful areas of inquiry, for example, may be regressions
between the facts in evidence and jury verdicts or between the facts in
evidence and unreasoned decisions of administrative tribunals.
There are also interesting conclusions about the way in which non-
pecuniary damages are calculated in Canada. First, there is the wide
discrepancy between the theories enunciated by the Supreme Court of
Canada and the practice of the lower courts. The study confirms our
hypothesis that the courts are in fact using a "tariff' approach to calculate
non-pecuniary damages (so much for quadriplegia, so much for ability to
work), just as they have always done15 and just as the Supreme Court of
Canada has told them not to do26. The study did not suggest that it made
any difference whether the lower court purported to follow, distinguish
or ignore the Supreme Court of Canada's "trilogy" on the issue.
25. Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, supra, note 18 at 361 et seq.
26. This is the "conceptual" approach decried by the Supreme Court of Canada (see note 14, supra).
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On the other hand, the study shows that non-pecuniary damages as
they are calculated in practice are neither random, unpredictable or
unintelligible. The damage awards are directly related to the number and
intensity of the injuries of the plaintiff and characteristics such as the sex
of the plaintiff or the province in which the judgment is rendered were
happily not found to be significant. Thus, the award of non-pecunary
damages in Canada, at least on the data used for this study, is not a
"lottery". The tariff described in these results provides an equitable and
consistent way for judges to calculate, counsel to predict and parties to
understand their non-pecuniary damage awards, once the appropriate
values for each head of injury are set. The tariff also allows legislatures or
appellate courts to adjust values consistently which they find to be too
high or too low. In all these respects, the practice of the judges is
preferable to the Supreme Court of Canada's hypothetical "functional
approach".
Appendix A
I Explanation of Variables
1. AWRD - The non-pecuniary damage award, in dollars. In statistical
terms, this is the dependent variable.
2. AGE - The age of the plaintiff receiving the award of non-pecuniary
damages. If the age is not mentioned, we assume it to be the average age
of plaintiffs whose ages were mentioned, to avoid skewing the data.
3. QUAD - Quadriplegia or paralysis of all four limbs. If the plaintiff
is quadriplegic, QUAD = 1, otherwise QUAD = 0.
4. PARA - Paralysis less than quadriplegia. If this applies to the
plaintiff, PARA = 1, otherwise PARA = 0.
5. CONT - Lack of bowel and/or bladder control as a result of the
defendant's negligence. In fact, all of the plaintiffs who were incontinent
were both bowel and bladder incontinent. If this injury is mentioned in
the judgment, CONT = 1, otherwise CONT = 0.
6. WORKPERM - The plaintiff is permanently unable to undertake
regular employment as a result of the defendant's negligence. If this is
mentioned in the judgment, WORKPERM = 1, otherwise WORK-
PERM = 0.
7. WORKPART - The plaintiff is, as a result of the defendant's
negligence, not able to work to the extent done before the negligent act.
If this injury is mentioned in the judgment, WORKPART = 1, otherwise
WORKPART = 0. Of course, if the plaintiff is totally and permanently
unable to work, WORKPART = 0 and WORKPERM = 1.
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8. MIND - Damage to the plaintiff's mental ability. Examples include
a fall in "IQ", inability to do simple arithmetic which the plaintiff could
do before the defendant's negligent act, loss of memory, inability to carry
on a conversation or to concentrate. If any of these or analogous injuries
are mentioned in the judgment, MIND = 1, otherwise MIND = 0.
9. PSYC - Emotional damage. Examples include depression, inability
to relate to friends and family in ways normal to the plaintiff, fear of
people generally. If any of these or analogous injuries are mentioned in
the judgment, PSYC = 1, otherwise PSYC = 0.
10. DISFEM - Noticeable, permanent injury to the plaintiff's body as
a result of the defendant's negligent act which the judge has not dismissed
as trivial or insignificant, where the plaintiff is female. Examples include
loss of limbs, reduced use of limbs short of paralysis, scars, loss of hair or
skin. If such damage is mentioned in the judgment, DISFEM = 1,
otherwise DISFEM = 0.
11. DISFM - Mutatis mutandis the same as DISFEM, except that the
plaintiff is male rather than female.
12. DCAR - Inability to drive a car due to the consequences of the
defendant's negligent act. If such injury is mentioned in the judgment,
DCAR = 1, otherwise DCAR = 0.
13. HOME - The plaintiff is unable to live at home without nursing or
other permanent care or supervision, or the plaintiff must reside in an
institution for the foreseeable future, due to the defendant's negligence. If
this injury is mentioned in the judgment. HOME = 1, otherwise HOME
=0.
14. LPAI - The length of pain experienced by the plaintiff, in weeks,
past and for the foreseeable future (according to the medical evidence
accepted by the judge), as a result of the defendant's negligence. If there
is no pain or pain is not addressed in the judgment, LPAI = 0. If pain is
mentioned but the duration of the pain is not stated, LPAI = 52 (one
year). If the judgment refers to cyclic or periodic pain, LPAI is counted
from the first reported pain to the end of expected pain or, if no end is
expected, LPAI = 52.
15. IPAI - An attempt to reflect the intensity of pain rather than just its
duration as in LPAI. IPAI is a scale: IPAI = 5 is "excruciating"; IPAI =
4 is "severe"; IPAI = 3 is "significant" or "continuous"; IPAI = 2 is "mild"
or "cyclic"; IPAI = I is "minor" or just "discomfort". The adjectives came
from the judgments.
16. IMPR - Prospects for improvement; i.e. for future complete or
partial reversal of the plaintiffs injuries. If the judge found that
improvement was unlikely or that it was possible that the plaintiffs
injuries would intensify over time, IMPR = 1. If it was likely that the
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plaintiff would improve, or if the judgment did not discuss the issue,
IMPR = 0.
17. TREA - Likelihood that the plaintiff would have to undergo future
medical treatment as a result of the present injuries. If such likelihood was
found by the judge, TREA = 1, otherwise TREA = 0.
18. HOSP - Number of days the plaintiff spent in hospital or similar
total care facility (eg. nursing home). This does not include home care,
visits to a doctor's office or intermittent therapy (eg. outpatient
treatments). If the number of days in hospital is not stated by the judge,
HOSP = 0.
19. SEXA - Loss of sex function for physical or emotional reasons due
to the negligence of the defendant. If the sex function has been lost
completely, SEXA = 2. If the function has merely been impaired, SEXA
= 1. If nothing is said on the subject in the judgment or if there has been
no loss in the function, SEXA = 0.
20. RECR - The plaintiff has lost the ability or interest to participate
in any social or recreational activity (eg. clubs, sports or even just the
ability to play with one's children) due to the defendant's negligence (but
not merely due to time in hospital or recuperation). If this injury is
mentioned in the judgment in any respect, RECR = 1, otherwise RECR
=0.
21. TRIL - The extent to which the judge made use of the Supreme
Court of Canada's judgments on non-pecuniary loss cited in notes 4 and
5. If the judge considered the trilogy as binding or applied them in any
other way beside "bearing them in mind" or merely comparing the
injuries of the plaintiff-at-bar with those in the trilogy decisions, TRIL =
3. If the judge only compared the injuries of the plaintiff-at-bar with the
injuries of the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court decisions, TRIL = 2. If the
judge mentions the Supreme Court judgments but does not do any more
(eg. following or distinguishing them), TRIL = 1. In all other cases,
TRIL = 0.
22. YR - The year in which the judgment was issued (trial or, if
appealed, the year in which the appeal was either allowed or dismissed).
23. AL, BC, MAN, NB, NF, NS, ONT, PEI, QUE, SASK - The
province in which the judgment was issued. The province in which the
judgment was issued = 1 with all other provinces set equal to = 0. For
example, where the judgment was one of the Prince Edward Island
Supreme Court, PEI = 1, AL = 0, BC = 0, MAN = 0, NB = 0, NF = 0,
NS = 0, ONT = 0, QUE = 0, SASK = 0.
24. SEX = If the plaintiff was female SEX = 1, otherwise SEX = 0.
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I. Logic of Variables
1. Except for YR, AWRD, LPAI, AGE and HOSP, which measured
known quantities (i. years, dollars, weeks, months, etc.), most of the
variables measured the existence or non-existence of a type of damage: 0
is no damage and 1 or a scale shows the existence of damage. The
exceptions to this principle are TRIL and SEX which described certain
aspects of thejudgment and plaintiff, respectively.
2. We assume that every factor (whether an injury like CONT or
QUAD or a characteristic like AGE or SEX) which a judge mentions in
the judgment was in his mind and considered in making the award of
non-pecuniary damages. As the judgment is a finding of fact (in the case
of a trial judge) or a recital of facts found by a trial judge (in the case of
an appellate judge), this assumption is justified by law as well as logic.
While judges may engage in obiter dicta on questions of law, they do not
generally indulge in idle chatter in finding facts and it is rational to
assume that the facts found, on the evidence presented, are relevant to the
decision. The multiple regression essentially tests this assumption.
3. When an injury is not mentioned in the judgment, we have generally
set it at 0. On the same logic as we used in including every variable which
was mentioned, we assumed that, if an injury was not mentioned, it either
had not occurred or the judge had not considered it in making the
damages award (perhaps because he did not believe the evidence relating
to it or did not consider it significant).
4. AGE and LPAI caused special problems when they were missing from
the judgment. Obviously, setting AGE at 0 would be tantamount to
assuming that the plaintiff had just been born, while, the judge having
mentioned pain, it sfiould have been illogical to assume that LPAI = 0, i.e.
that the pain had no duration. Therefore, in the case of AGE, we assumed
that the plaintiff was the average age of all the plaintiffs in the sample
because, statistically, the sample mean can be shown to be equal to the
population mean. Thus assuming that the missing values are equal to the
sample mean minimises bias in estimating the regression equation. In the
case of LPAI, where life expectancy was available in the judgment and
pain was expected to last the plaintiff's life, we set LPAI equal to the
plaintiff's expected remaining days of life. In other cases, we set LPAI
equal to the number of days during which the plaintiff was said to have
experienced pain up to the date of the judgment. SEX might have been
another problem of this sort, but we were able to ascertain the sex of the
plaintiff in each case used, from the plaintiffs first name cross-checked
with the forms of address used by the judge in the judgment (eg. "Mr."
or "IVIrs.", "He" or "She").
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HI Research Methodology
1. The cases used were personal injury cases where damages were
awarded in negligence and where the amount was $5,000 or more, in all
Provinces, from the handing down of the trilogy judgments by the
Supreme Court of Canadian 1978 until data collection stopped in mid-
1982.
2. The source of cases was the Canadian Abridgment volume for
Damages in the section for Non-pecuniary Loss in Tort. Only reported
cases were used. The Abridgment was also used to discover cases by
noting up the trilogy and Lindal v. Lindal cases.
3. Negligence cases were used on the basis that, although non-pecuniary
loss may be awarded for some intentional torts like assault and battery,
the award may be affected by a punitive element in these cases which
should not appear in negligence. In the intentional tort cases it would not
be clear whether the value of the plaintiffs injuries or the impermissibility
of the defendant's conduct was being assessed.
4. The $5,000 threshold was used because most of the jurisprudence in
this area deals with serious injury such as quadriplegia and also because
injuries in the cases below $5,000 tend not to involve the same sorts of
variables (paralysis, incontinence, inability to work, etc.) which have
impact on the larger cases. Many of the smaller cases would thus have 0
values for all the variables in the survey, distorting the statistics. Where
they did have values (eg. for disfigurement) they might be quite
misleading: the "disfigurement" of a minor scar under the clothing for
which one might receive $1,000 is virtually a different injury from a
distorted face or lost limb for which one might receive $5,000, yet both
would have to receive a "1" for disfigurement. Alternatively, we would
have had to subjectively weight the disfigurement variable to show how
much more important one type of disfigurement was than the other,
which would have been statistically doubtful.
5. No attempt was made to select or randomise the cases: every case
which could be located and met the criteria of paragraph 1 of this Part
of this Appendix was included. While it is not warranted that every
reported case was discovered, virtually all the cases during the relevant
period were discovered and used. The only case specifically deleted was
Knutson v. Farr which concerned an unconscious plaintiff who was
arbitrarily awarded one-half the maximum award. This was deleted on
the ground that it was qualitatively different to the rest of the cases and
that the arbitrary nature of the award would bias the sample.
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6. The study was originally done in 1982-84 at the University of British
Columbia. However, in 1988, Dr. Forster re-worked the statistical
method and ran the regression again in 1988, at Griffith University in
Brisbane, Australia. The re-working involved going back to the case
reports to change some of the data entries. Despite our best efforts, some
of the cases in the original data set, including all three of the Quebec cases
in the original set, could not be obtained in Australia. Therefore, these
had to be dropped from the set.
IV Statistical Analysis
As the equations have resulted, the award is determined by summing the
injuries sustained, each injury weighted by an estimated parameter value.
The parameter value indicates or measures the impact of that injury in
dollar terms upon the overall level of the award. In mathematical terms
this is a straightforward linear function of the simplest type: more
complex functional forms and transformations of variables (such as
logarithmic functions) did not perform nearly as well statistically as the
results presented. The result is especially useful because the linear form
allows us to treat the parameter estimates directly as dollar values in
determining the overall award.
The regression was run twice: once with a constraint that the intercept
equal 0 and once without such a constraint. "Model 1" is with no
constraint and "Model 2" is with the intercept held at 0. "Model 2" is
reported in the text of the paper. The reason for running two models is
two-fold: (1) because of the nature of the regression model and (2)
because of the legal imperative that awards must vary with the degree of
the injuries and thus, that no or very small injuries must yield no or a very
small award.
Theoretically, if a plaintiff receives judgment in negligence but has no
non-pecuniary losses (ie. no pain, suffering, physical, mental or
emotional injury or loss of amenities or bodily function), two conclusions
must follow:
(i) each of the variables in the regression equation must have a value of
zero and therefore
(ii) the award as summed by the regression equation must equal zero.
In Model 1, we permitted the intercept term to be estimated from the
statistical analysis, which produced a coefficient of $31,495.87. As such
a result is inconsistent with the legal and theoretical imperatives just
described, we tried the regression again in Model 2 with the intercept
coefficient fixed at 0. In every other respect the methodology of entering
the data into the computer is identical between Model 1 and Model 2.
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The statistical results in Model 1 and Model 2 are quite similar in
many respects, with those in Model 2 being uniformly superior. R 2 was
0.722 for Model 1 and 0.883 for Model 2. The associated adjusted
coefficient of determination was 0.698 for Model 1 and 0.872 for Model
2. The F statistic was 26.20 for Model 1 and 68.68 for Model 2.
Therefore Model 2 is superior not only in terms of what is legally-
acceptable (that zero injury should yield zero award) but also in terms of
the standards of statistical evaluation. For these reasons, Model 2 results
are reported in the text and Model 1 results are merely included for
information in this Appendix.
The output of Model 2 includes all the variables which are present in
Model 1, with the exception of YEAR, which appears in Model 2. Also,
we note that the coefficients in Model 2 and Model 1 are strikingly
similar, many within one per cent of each other. All of the variables are
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
The variable YEAR in Model 2 is rather curious, suggesting, at a high
degree of significance, that the value of the award increases by $379.22
each year merely by the effiuxion of time. To the extent that it is a
surrogate for inflation, YEAR is grossly understated, suggesting, at a time
when prices were rising at 7-10% per year, that the judges were adding on
less than 1% to the awards each year. To the extent that the variable really
does represent the effluxion of time, it is overstated, as the passage of time
is not legally sufficient to justify giving a later plaintiff with the same
injuries and circumstances a higher award (even by a few hundred
dollars) than an earlier plaintiff. This result is an anomaly and it is not
clear what (if anything) it means, but it is not central to the validity or
interpretation of the study as a whole.
The other variables which were found to be significant seem to be
quite consistent with legal principles. Note that age is chronological age
of the plaintiff and has nothing directly to do with life expectancy. Life
expectancy was deliberately not included as a variable, as damages for
the loss of expectation of life is compensated as a separate head of
damages from oter non-pecuniary loss. The reduction of the Canadian
awards as the plaintiff is older suggests an awareness of the sort of overlap
between non-pecuniary loss and loss of life expectancy which led English
judges to limit loss of expectation of life awards in Benham v. Gambling,
[1941] A.C. 157 (H.L.) and the British Parliament to abolish them
altogether in the Administration of Justice Act 1982, c. 53, s. 1. Still it
seems logical that, as a plaintiff is older, he will suffer his loss for a lesser
period of time and thus is less damaged, for instance, than a child who
must bear the losses for life. Thus, there is a rational explanation for the
negative sign of the age variable and the result shows that Canadian
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judges (although they do not directly refer to these precedents) are
consistent with their English brethren (see 12 Halsbury's Laws of
England para. 1147 n.1 (4th ed. 1979) in this regard.)
The high awards for paralysis, incontinence, inability to live at home
and inability to work are roughly what one would expect, as these are
considered, both on the bench and in the community, as the most serious
injuries. In fact, these injuries are the composite picture of the "worst
case" plaintiffs acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada:
Andrews, Teno, Thornton or Lindal qualify as having 'all of the above'.
Add the coefficients for QUAD, CONT, NWORK AND HOME, then
deflate them by, say, Andrews' age (multiplied by the AGE coefficient of
548.19) and you have something very close to the $100,000 maximum
set by the Supreme Court of Canada for these types of cases. It is
interesting (and also expected) that paralysis per se is valued as less than
one-half the damage of the total paralysis which is quadriplegia.
The fact that a partial inability to work is valued at a higher award
than a complete inability to work may be at first glance anomalous.
However, given the Supreme Court's declared worries about "double-
counting" damages and overlapping between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary loss awards, it is not surprising that the judges would
somewhat reduce awards for a total inability to work (where damages for
lost income and future care are most generous) but not make a reduction
for a partial inability to work where significant overlap is far less likely.
In fact, this directly mimics the approach of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Andrews' Case, although no court in the survey openly
addressed this issue in its stated reasons on non-pecuniary loss.
Another interesting result is the fact that the regression showed female
disfigurement (DISFEM) to be significant in determining the level of the
award, but not male disfigurement (DISFM). There is no traditional legal
justification for this result whatsoever: but there is a socio-legal
justification for it. If the physical appearance of females is valued, both by
the plaintiff subjectively and by the "reasonable person" in Canadian
society, but the physical appearance of males is not so valued, then
females suffer damage when they are disfigured but men do not: and such
damage must be compensated in the case of females but not in the case
of males. This argument (and the regression) seems to overstate the case,
but there is a grain of common sense in it.
LPAI seems rather small at $11.82 per day - far less than the average
wage and still farther less than what one might demand to be paid to
undergo pain continuously for a week! It is unfortunate that IPAI did not
show as significant, as this would allow some scaling of this variable: it
might be right for "mild" or "cyclic" pain but seems ridiculously low for
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"excruciating" pain. On the other hand, one explanation for this result
might be the medical fact that excruciating pain tends to last a far shorter
time, on the average, than a mild or cyclic pain, so that a duration-of-pain
measure alone might be expected to reflect the less-severe forms of pain.
The result might also have been affected by the number of cases where
the duration was missing in the judges' reasons and set arbitrarily at one
year, which is a comparatively short time. Yet even on this calculation,
little Elaine Teno, who could expect pain or discomfort for much of her
70-odd year life expectancy, would receive something like $43,000 for
this injury alone!
Finally, we must address the variables which were not found to be
significant in determining the level of award for non-pecuniary loss.
There are two reasons why a variable might not be found significant in
such a study: (1) that the injury or characteristic represented by the
variable really does carry no significant weight in the decision on how
high the award is and (2) that there were not enough occurrances of the
variable in the data set to cause it to be factored into the regression
equation. In the absence of further information, which reason applies in
respect of a given variable must be largely a matter of judgment.
Mental and emotional damage (PSYC and MIND) surely seem to
make a significant impression upon the judges merely from reading their
reasons. Their absence from the list of significant variables is quite
surprising. Yet, along with inability to drive a car, intensity of pain, poor
improvement prospects, likelihood of further treatment, hospitalisation,
sex dysfunction and loss of recreations, these injuries tend to be associated
with the more significant injuries of paralysis, incontinence, disfigure-
ment, inability to work and inability to live at home, which would tend
to knock these variables out of the regression equation. Again, if this
shows anything, it shows that the practice of the judges is quite effective
at avoiding double compensation for related injuries.
The authors are happy to note that irrelevant considerations like the
sex of the plaintiff or the location of the court are not shown significant
in the calculation of damage awards. As noted in the text, the Supreme
Court of Canada's judgements do not seem to be directly relevant either.
In summary, the study seems statistically valid and the results seem
both logically and legally justifiable. The authors conclude that the
regression technique is a useful tool for analysis of unreasoned or
partially-reasoned legal decisions and note the logic and sophistication
with which Canadian judges seem to be administering their informal
tariff of awards within the global "non-pecuniary loss" head.
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MODEL 1 R-square = 0.72152567
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Prob > F
Regression 9 92621166195.128 10291240688348 26.20 0.0001
Error 91 35747330484.080 392827807.51736 -
Total 100 128368496679.21
Parameter Standard Type 11
Variable Estimate Error Sum of Squares F Prob > F
INTERCEP 31495.87305295 5921.16196805 11114646223.106 28.29 0.0001
AGE -579.00894122 131.68571227 7594434649.5067 19.33 0.0001
QUAD 70835.14989048 14917.73414033 8857152687.5789 22.55 0.0001
PARA 30034.62200024 6399.09481931 8653852193.7740 22.03 0.0001
CONT 22864.71496381 6881.23815043 4337111923.0149 11.04 0.0013
NWORK 16088.57393744 6707.09899804 2260309400.1970 5.75 0.0185
PWORK 25009.19617177 4491.11160113 12181309986.584 31.01 0.0001
DISFEM 15055.03280337 5148.10069842 3359476201.0191 8.55 0.0044
HOME 23915.29109713 7675.17939582 3813963175.3080 9.71 0.0025
LPAI 11.93693353 4.13122522 3279669116.0124 8.35 0.0048
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MODEL 2
DF Sum of Squares
R-square = 0.88300817







Error Sum of Squares
Regression
Error
Total
Variable
AGE
QUAD
PARA
CONT
NWORK
PWORK
DISFEM
HOME
LPAI
YEAR
68.68 0.0001
F Prob >F
17.84 0.0001
22.29 0.0001
22.14 0.0001
10.58 0.0016
5.71 0.0190
29.57 0.0001
8.24 0.0051
9.79 0.0024
8.04 0.0056
26.66 0.0001
-548.19421721 129.80380062 7103663254.6322
70920.71956792 15021.94045205 88773323183277
30299.80173023 6438.96821845 8819323914.1313
22546.96455474 6932.42760171 4213022339.0777
16136.87549853 6754.35183405 2273316066.2969
24754.55527299 4552.33666720 11776867655.701
14898.86752871 5190.59888706 3281405200.7329
24173.79013035 7724.84746310 3900299461.1971
11.81653098 4.16681581 3203020156.9408
379.21578678 73.44270509 10618514667.619
